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An evolutionary conception of contract law is suggested as a basis for assessing claims made in 
the autonomy-paternalism debate. Paternalism forms one part – although by no means the whole 
– of a discriminating approach to contract enforcement. Selective enforcement is a long-standing 
feature of contract law systems, which have developed alongside the emergence of market-based 
economies in liberal democratic societies. Contractual regulation of this kind can be justifi ed in 
normative terms by reference to capability theory. Markets are signifi cant capability-enhancing 
institutions, but their effect depends on complementary regulatory mechanisms, including some 
of those commonly (if not always accurately) termed ‘paternalistic’.
1 Introduction
Legal paternalism has been defi ned as an approach in which ‘the law seeks to override 
individual choice on the ground that the individual or individuals in question might 
not exercise that choice wisely, with consequential harm to themselves’.1 Paternalism, 
so defi ned, appears to involve the rejection of individual autonomy. It also seems to 
run counter to deep-rooted principles of private law, such as freedom of contract. Yet, 
paternalism is also widespread: ‘legal systems of western liberal democracies contain 
innumerable paternalistic rules and doctrines.’2 This poses the twin questions of how to 
explain the prevalence of paternalism in modern, market-based economies and whether 
such intervention can be justifi ed in normative terms.
 This article will attempt to answer both questions by drawing on an evolutionary 
view of contract law. This is a perspective that sees contract law in functional terms as 
providing a framework for market-based exchange. Contract law performs this role, 
among other things, by taking a discriminating view of which contracts to enforce. 
Paternalistic justifi cations form a part, but only a part, of contract law’s selective 
approach to enforcement. Selective enforcement has been a feature of all modern 
contract law systems, even at the height of nineteenth century ‘laissez faire’. The rules 
of contract law governing when and on what conditions contracts are enforced are the 
public expression of emergent solutions to coordination problems that have arisen in 
market settings of various kinds. Some of them can be found within private law doctrines 
(ranging from the narrowly defi ned ‘incapacity’ and ‘public policy’ to the more widely 
ranging ‘good faith’), and some owe their existence to legislative intervention in specifi c 
contexts, such as worker or consumer protection. Whatever their origin, these rules of 
contract law express or encode norms of behaviour that, experience has shown, have the 
potential to contribute to market formation in various ways.
 It neither necessary nor desirable to confl ate the set of paternalistic interventions with 
the wider set of regulatory interventions in contract law. Paternalism can be justifi ed 
where parties need to be protected against the negative welfare implications of their 
own choices. This describes a narrow range of cases in which parties do not display 
rationality in contracting, that it so say, an ability to exercise choice in a consistent 
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at 62.
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way. The contract law doctrines of incapacity and undue infl uence provide illustrations 
of this type of justifi cation for non-enforcement. However, other doctrines giving rise 
to selective enforcement, such as most of the heads of public policy, and instances of 
contractual regulation of the kind that are widespread in employment law and consumer 
protection law, cannot be explained in paternalistic terms. When parties enter into 
employment or consumer contracts on the basis of limited information or in situations 
of inequality of bargaining power, they may be making contracts that are based on 
mistaken beliefs or that are welfare-reducing in some way, but they are not acting 
‘irrationally’ in the sense required for paternalistic intervention. The law intervenes 
here not to protect parties against themselves, but to overcome externalities and address 
information asymmetries in such as way as to extend the scope of the market and hence 
the division of labour, thereby promoting general societal well-being.
 Selective enforcement is not a marginal addition to contract law, but is, rather, 
part of its core function in a market economy; it is also core to contract law in the 
internal legal sense of explaining some of its central doctrinal features. Two normative 
objections are commonly made against selective enforcement. The fi rst is that the 
effects of regulation are indeterminate. Emergent regulatory solutions are necessarily 
imperfect: they may be transplanted out of context or lose their effectiveness over 
time in a changing environment. How far this is the case cannot be resolved a priori, 
but only through applied empirical work. The second objection is more basic. Even if 
regulatory interventions enhance aggregate well-being, they do so by making certain 
market participants (the wealthy, the well-informed or the simply fortunate) worse off 
than they would otherwise be. They can therefore be viewed (and have been by courts 
from time to time) as equivalent to an unconstitutional interference with contract and 
property rights.3
 The resolution of this second question requires more than an empirical analysis of 
how contract law operates, although this can help in clarifying the nature and extent of 
the effects involved. In addition, it requires a consideration of the meaning of the notion 
of ‘private autonomy’ in a market setting. It will be argued here that the law of contract 
should (and generally does) protect private autonomy in the sense of the capacity (or 
‘capability’) of individuals to participate in market-based exchange, but that this is 
not the same thing as the right to conduct an exchange free of legal regulation. This 
argument will be developed through the use of examples drawn from the regulation of 
contracts in labour market settings.
2 Evolutionary Perspectives on Contract Law
Gintis4 has recently proposed a unifi ed evolutionary account of the behavioural sciences 
consisting of fi ve conceptual building blocks: gene-culture coevolution,5 the socio-
psychological theory of norms,6 game theory, the rational actor model7 and complexity 
(or systems) theory.8 A unifi ed evolutionary theory of law would also draw on these 
3 Most signifi cantly, and controversially, in the decision of the US Supreme Court in Lochner v. New 
York, 198 US 45 (1905).
4 H. Gintis, The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unifi cation of the Behavioural Sciences 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2009) ch. 12.
5 Gene-culture coevolution, sometimes referred to as ‘dual inheritance theory’, is the idea that genetic 
evolution both infl uences and is infl uenced by aspects of the environment that are culturally transmitted 
across generations, that is to say, embodied in enduring practices and routines. See R. Boyd and P. Richerson, 
Culture and the Evolutionary Process (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press 1985); P. Richerson and R. 
Boyd, Not by Genes Alone (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press 2004).
6 Sociological and psychological theories see norms not simply as external constraints on action but as 
internalised standards of behaviour: see Gintis, above n. 4, at 212-214.
7 On the rational actor model as the foundation of game-theoretical models of strategic interaction, see 
Gintis, above n. 4, at ch. 3.
8 Complexity theory and systems theory are not synonymous, but for present purposes it is suffi cient to 
emphasise the elements they have in common, in particular the idea of systems as emergent orders with 
adaptive, that is to say, evolutionary properties. The properties of systems are ‘emergent’ in the sense 
that they arise from the interaction of the component parts of the system and cannot be reduced to these 
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elements, although they are not all of equal importance in understanding contemporary 
legal phenomena. The nature of the link between human genetic evolution and modern-
day legal institutions, in particular, remains poorly understood, and further work is 
required to demonstrate the relevance of models of gene-culture coevolution in this 
context. For the purposes of theorising contract law, the interplay between game-
theoretical models of strategic action, which make use of the (boundedly) rational actor 
model, and the idea of society as consisting as a set of adaptive systems, should be 
the focus of analysis. Game theory can take us part of the way in understanding the 
evolutionary dimensions of contractual behaviour, but, as Gintis emphasises, it cannot go 
the whole way, since the macro-level properties of adaptive systems cannot be deduced 
from micro-level modelling using game-theoretical axioms.9 Gintis’s focus is on the 
behavioural sciences, and he does not extend his analysis to include a normative theory 
of social institutions. The study of law is not, or is only partially, a behavioural social 
science, and an evolutionary theory of law should in principle embrace interpretive and 
normative elements. Capability theory10 offers one way forward here. 
 From an evolutionary perspective, the ‘market’ consists of a set of linked practices 
or routines that govern decentralised exchange. When the market functions effectively, 
it operates to ensure that scarce resources are allocated to alternate uses in a way that 
reconciles individual autonomy with collective welfare. Market practices such as 
exchange, pricing and arbitrage can be understood as emerging through the repeated 
interactions of numerous individual agents. Having been stabilised through routinisation, 
these practices are essentially self-organising and self-reproducing.
 The evolved or emergent nature of market behaviour is generally taken to be the 
antithesis of centralised direction, whether through law or otherwise.11 However, 
viewing the market as a self-organising system, in itself, tells us very little about the 
role that contract law plays in relation to market outcomes. This is because to view 
the legal system as directing market outcomes through a form of hierarchical ordering 
is misleading. The legal system is itself an adaptive system, which possesses many 
of the features of self-organisation that evolutionary theory ascribes to the market. 
The issue becomes one of understanding the nature of the inter-systemic evolution, or 
‘coevolution’, involved in the law-market relationship.12
 The predominant approach within law and economics is to see legal rules as an 
expression of an underlying behavioural logic. In Becker’s foundational account, the 
economic axioms of ‘maximising behaviour, market equilibrium and stable preferences’ 
are capable, if ‘relentlessly and unfl inchingly applied’, of explaining all societal 
phenomena, including the legal system.13 These three assumptions can, even more 
parsimoniously, be reduced to two core ideas: a theory of individual behaviour based 
on optimisation and a theory of societal organisation based on the idea of the self-
equilibrating market.
component parts. See H. Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). They are evolutionary or adaptive in the sense of being subject to 
evolutionary processes of inheritance (stabilisation on the basis of the persistence of the system’s internal 
‘code’), variation (random mutation at the point of self-copying or self-reproduction of the system) and 
selection (selective survival of traits on the basis of a standard of environmental fi tness). Luhmann’s theory 
of social systems makes extensive use of the idea of adaptation, while insisting that evolutionary processes 
are ‘internalised’ at the level of each system. See N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, trans. K. Ziegert, 
ed. F. Kastner, R. Nobles, D. Schiff and R. Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004) ch. 6 (‘The 
Evolution of Law’).
9 Gintis, above n. 4, at 248: ‘The traditional equilibrium concept in game theory, the Nash equilibrium, 
is implemented by rational actors only if they share beliefs as to how the game will be played … [but] the 
rational actor model includes no principles entailing the communality of beliefs across individuals. For this 
reason, the complex Nash equilibria that arise in modelling the coordination of behaviour in groups do not 
emerge spontaneously from the interaction of rational agents.’
10 As recently restated by A. Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane 2009) chs. 11-14.
11 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Liberalism and 
Political Economy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980).
12 Luhmann, above n. 8; G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford: Blackwell 1993).
13 G. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1976).
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 The research programme associated with ‘behavioural law and economics’ has 
largely focused on the fi rst of these two ideas, to the relative neglect of the second. 
Prospect theory has identifi ed a number of pervasive behavioural traits that appear to 
refute aspects of the rational actor model.14 Yet, on one view, the core of rational actor 
theory remains intact. This is what Gintis15 calls the ‘beliefs, preferences and constraints’ 
(BPC) model. Actors form preferences that are based on their beliefs about the world. 
They act ‘rationally’ with regard to these preferences when they choose from among 
alternative courses of action in a way that is consistent with respect to anticipated 
outcomes. Choice-consistency, or stability of preferences, is all that is required here; 
the more demanding postulates of the expected utility theorem go beyond what is 
necessary for the basic model to work. The insights of behavioural economics into the 
circumstances under which individuals behave ‘irrationally’ – that is, in an apparently 
less than welfare-maximising way – can all be explained as cases in which individuals 
maximise with reference to a given preference function. The idea of bounded rationality 
can be accommodated in this way; actors’ preferences are determined by their current 
state of knowledge of the world, which is a function, in part, of their (limited) cognitive 
capacity. In addition, other-regarding behaviour – altruism – can be modelled in choice-
consistent terms. This is a central fi nding of the models that have been developed in the 
past decade in evolutionary and epistemic game theory, and it is supported by a growing 
body of empirical literature, much of it based on laboratory experiments, but now 
supplemented by fi eld work studies.16 Thus, rationality need not imply ‘selfi shness’. 
More generally, it is not inconsistent with the BPC model to assume that individuals do 
not always choose correctly (they may act consistently while still being mistaken about 
the state of the world), that they change their beliefs over time in response to a changing 
environment (this is not the same thing as being unable to rank different outcomes at 
the point of contracting) or that their choices, once made, do not in fact maximise their 
welfare (this is to confuse the basis for action with its consequences).
 With these important qualifi cations, the rational actor model can be understood 
as a value-neutral, generalisable account of behaviour under conditions of economic 
scarcity. However, diffi culties begin when the theory is used to generate a theory of 
societal organisation and, even more so, when it is used to construct a normative theory 
for use in the design of legal institutions.
 The rational actor model alone cannot account for the existence of the structures that 
make societal coordination possible.17 Rational actor theory provides the basis for game-
theoretical models of decentralised coordination. These models frequently imply a radical 
disjuncture between individual rationality and optimal societal outcomes. Individual 
strategies may spontaneously converge on stable states that maximise aggregate 
welfare, but the conditions under which they do so are extremely restrictive. The game-
theoretical concept of ‘correlated equilibrium’ predicts convergence of this kind only 
when individual agents possess common knowledge of what other agents will do and 
hence can predict future societal states.18 Knowledge of future states cannot be derived 
from experience of past interactions alone but depends on correlating devices, which 
include social norms19 and more formal ‘public indicators’ such as legal rules.20 Norms 
and rules, which are particular types of a more general set of institutional phenomena, 
serve as summary representations of the recursive patterns or routines around which 
individual actors expect future strategies to converge. There is a continuum between 
social norms and publicly-expressed legal rules, with the latter tending to crystallise the 
former.
14 D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2000).
15 Gintis, above n. 4, at 1.
16 Id., at ch. 3.
17 Id., at 44.
18 R. Aumann, ‘Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality’ (1987) 55 Econometrica 
1.
19 Gintis, above n. 4, at 240-242.
20 M. Aoki, Corporations in Evolving Diversity: Cognition, Governance and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2010) at 128.
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 How norms evolve and how they operate is a key issue for the behavioural sciences 
and, by extension, for legal scholars interested in viewing legal phenomena from a 
social science perspective. To address the question effectively involves an acceptance 
that public indicators such as norms and legal rules operate at a different level from that 
of the interactions of individual agents. This does not mean that the indicators of this 
kind are exogenously supplied, whether by government or by a pre-existing moral order. 
Norms and rules can be understood as emerging endogenously, that is to say, on the 
basis of the accumulated experience of individual agents, but, since they also frame the 
behaviour of those agents, they cannot be described in exclusively behavioural terms. 
The relationship between norms and behaviour is one of mutual interaction, that is to 
say, of coevolution.
 Normative orders, such as the legal system, make it possible to code, store and 
transmit the accumulated knowledge on which societal coordination depends. Orders of 
this kind are ‘systemic’ in the sense that they are adaptive to their environment. This does 
not mean that they are precisely aligned to their external context. The accumulation and 
transmission of knowledge across time and space implies that some kind of inheritance 
or retention process is in operation, akin to (but not necessarily identical to) the 
process of genetic transmission.21 Selection may ensure some kind of ‘fi t’ between the 
content of norms and rules and the environment in which they are applied, but, unless 
the context is unchanging or otherwise very stable, the information contained within 
normative orders can only be completely functional for past environments. As some 
degree of misalignment between normative orders and their (present) environments is 
unavoidable, normative solutions to coordination problems are necessarily imperfect 
and incomplete.
 Contract law is an emergent normative order that has evolved over time in a way that 
loosely matches, in the sense just described, the conditions of the societies in which it 
operates. It does not literally describe external social ‘reality’ but instead recreates its 
external environment in ways that can be understood in terms of its own dynamics. Thus, 
external economic phenomena have to be redescribed in the conceptual or dogmatic 
terms of legal analysis.22 The study of legal concepts (which can be distinguished from 
the analysis of rules as such) makes it possible to reconstruct, in historical terms, the 
process by which the legal system has shaped, and has been shaped by, the emergent 
market order.23
 From this perspective, the answer to the question of how societal coordination 
emerges from the micro-foundations of individual agents’ behaviour and beliefs is to be 
found, in part, within contract law itself, that is to say, within the body of doctrine that 
informs the production and reproduction of legal rules concerning contracts. Contract 
law has its own accounts of ‘individual rationality’ and ‘societal coordination’.24
3 The Capacity Concept and the Conceptualisation of the Market in 
Contract Law
All contract law systems recognise the principle that a simple exchange, even between 
otherwise consenting parties, is not enough to found a legally binding contract. It has 
to be shown, in addition, that each party has the capacity to contract. One aspect of 
capacity is the ability of a contracting party to assess whether a transaction is in its 
best interests. The law presumes that this may not be so in the case of the young, on 
the grounds of their immaturity and inexperience, and with regard to those such as the 
very old or mentally ill, who for one reason or another may be unable to understand the 
21 S. Deakin, ‘Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics’ (2003) 55 Current Legal Problems 
1.
22 Luhmann, above n. 8; Teubner, above n. 12.
23 S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and Legal 
Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005).
24 See S. Deakin, ‘Capacitas: Contract Law, Capabilities, and the Legal Foundations of the Market’ in 
S. Deakin and A. Supiot (eds.), Capacitas: Contract Law and the Institutional Foundations of a Market 
Economy (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2009), on which the following section draws.
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consequences of their actions.25 Thus, the concept of capacity is based on the view that 
one of the preconditions for the enforcement of contracts is that individuals possess 
the capability for rational economic action, understood as the ability to make decisions 
about exchange in a choice-consistent way.
 The common law concept of undue infl uence performs a similar function, denying 
contract enforcement in cases where one party, with the knowledge or assumed 
knowledge of the other, enters into a transaction in a context where their ability to 
understand and express their own best interests is limited. This can occur, for example, 
where family ties, religious or social affi liations, or dependence on another for advice 
or expertise qualify the ability to exercise independent judgment.26 Viewed in this way, 
undue infl uence and the capacity concept express a similar underlying logic.
 However, the capacity concept is not limited to providing an account of individual 
rationality. It is also predicated upon assumptions about the need for institutional 
underpinning of market exchange. In this sense, it discloses a theory of the societal 
organisation needed to make markets function.
 Thus, one aim of the doctrine of capacity is, without doubt, the paternalist one of 
providing protection to the incapable. But the doctrine also protects the market against 
the incapable,27 by excluding them from unassisted participation in exchange relations. 
They may enter into transactions, but only with the aid of intermediaries, thanks to 
the doctrines of assistance and representation. These ideas, which are formally stated 
in the civil law and implicit to some degree in the common law rules, are intended to 
enhance the contractual security of third parties and thereby secure confi dence in market 
transactions in general.28 Thus, an inference that may be drawn from the structure of 
contract law is that legal enforcement of contracts matters, along with its corollary, 
namely selective non-enforcement. The maintenance of the market order depends upon 
the legal system being able to take a discriminating view on which contracts to enforce 
and on how, or on what conditions, to enforce them.
 To say that this is a basic assumption of contract law systems is not to imply that 
contract law necessarily works this way in practice. Empirical observation, informed 
by economic or sociological theory, might be able to confi rm the functionality (in this 
sense) of contract law, but this type of evidence cannot be directly inferred from the 
study of contract law doctrine. Contract law doctrine provides an insight into how the 
legal system has come to view the external effects of its own enforcement mechanisms. 
In the ‘internal’ discourse of contract law doctrine, the market is seen not as a natural 
state of affairs but instead as the product of a certain institutional confi guration. In this 
respect, contract law’s view of the market is a very different perspective from that of 
mainstream law and economics, which is itself, of course, no more a description of an 
external social or economic reality than contract law doctrine is. ‘Law and economics’ 
is just a certain economic doctrine’s view of the legal system.
 A number of other doctrines provide for selectivity in the enforcement of consensual 
transactions. In the common law systems, the doctrine of ‘public policy’ sets out a 
series of such grounds.29 These consist of a range of apparently ad hoc and unconnected 
justifi cations: ‘restraint of trade’, ‘agreements injurious to good government’ and 
‘agreements contrary to family life’, and so on. Viewed functionally, these justifi cations 
divide into two categories: cases in which non-enforcement is justifi ed by the need to 
protect the market against itself (or, more precisely, against the market-limiting effects 
of consensual exchange) and cases in which the aim of selective enforcement is the 
protection of society against the market.
 The doctrine of ‘restraint of trade’ is concerned with protecting the market against 
itself or, more precisely, against the freedom of market actors to make agreements 
that hinder the operation of the market. Market entry and exit rules, price fi xing, wage 
25 See E. McKendrick, Contract Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2009, 8th ed.) ch. 15.
26 Id., at ch. 16.
27 See M. Hesselink, ‘Capacity and Capability in European Contract Law’ in Deakin and Supiot, above n. 
24.
28 S. Godelain, ‘Le concept de capacité dans le droit des contrats français’ in Deakin and Supiot, above n. 
24.
29 McKendrick, above n. 25, at ch. 14.
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regulation and other forms of contractual self-regulation of the market potentially come 
within the scope of the restraint of trade doctrine. Contract law recognises that the 
competitive process on which the market order depends for its successful operation 
can be undermined by the very value of freedom of contract that the market is meant 
to uphold. Selective legal enforcement of contracts is a precondition for a functioning 
market order.
 The other heads of public policy cannot be explained as protecting the market against 
itself. Instead, they involve the assertion of certain social values that take priority over 
the market. When courts refuse to enforce contracts that are ‘contrary to public morals’, 
that undermine governmental authority, or that oust their own jurisdiction, they are 
recognising that certain institutions, such as the family, the apparatus of government and 
the legal system itself, are not just separate from the market but operate according to a 
logic that is not that of market relations. For these reasons, they require legal protection 
from the potentially destabilising effects of the market.
 The list of grounds of non-enforcement is, nevertheless, selective and, arguably, 
outdated. At the turn of the twentieth century, courts in most common law jurisdictions, 
taking their lead from the House of Lords, held that the heads of public policy, as 
they then existed, were a closed set.30 This was, in part, a refl ection of the view that 
the foremost goal of public policy should be to defend freedom of contract itself.31 
But it was also the product of judicial abstention in the face of the growing body of 
regulatory legislation that was emerging at that time. The English courts recognised 
that the formulation of social and economic policy was an area in which Parliament was 
increasingly taking the lead.32
 In the course of the twentieth century, social and economic legislation displaced 
both the capacity concept and public policy as a source of contractual regulation. 
The rise of regulatory legislation gave rise to a process that legal historians refer to 
as ‘derationalisation’, signifying the fragmentation of the unitary concept of capacity: 
new forms of legal protection have arisen, representing new interests.33 In consumer 
protection and employment protection law, the law substantially qualifi ed the concept of 
freedom of contract, but without using the technique of incapacitation to do so. Instead, 
legislation imposed mandatory and default rules of various kinds as a condition of 
contractual enforcement.
 The relationship between social or regulatory legislation and the notion of contractual 
capacity has never been less than highly contested. In the early decades of the twentieth 
century, the language of capacity was invoked to argue that mandatory regulation was 
an inappropriate and, in some jurisdictions, unconstitutional constraint on freedom of 
contract.34 During the 1980s, some of these arguments resurfaced, along with a new 
emphasis on the alleged ineffi ciency of social legislation as a mode of contractual 
regulation. Deregulatory policy initiatives found inspiration in the US-based law and 
economics movement, which acquired a certain intellectual resonance around this 
time, as the institutional forms that had been designed for a world of protected national 
economies and stable economic relationships were unravelling. A principal example 
of this is the conceptual ‘crisis’ affecting the legal institution of the employment 
relationship.35 However, a simple return to private law, through ‘deregulation’, has not 
proved to be feasible. Despite the efforts of political opponents of the welfare state, 
contractual regulation remains all-pervasive in liberal democracies with a commitment 
30 Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd. [1902] AC 484.
31 Printing and Numerical Registering Co. Ltd. v. Sampson (1875) 19 LR Eq 462.
32 The English courts were not able to invoke a higher constitutional authority to review the propriety of 
regulatory legislation, as the US courts were able to in Lochner, above n. 3.
33 A. Wijffels, ‘Rationalisation and Derationalisation of Legal Capacity in Historical Perspective: Some 
General Caveats’, in Deakin and Supiot, above n. 24.
34 For the use of the term ‘capacity’ in US constitutional cases on social legislation around this time, see 
the judgments in Lochner, above n. 3, and in Muller v. Oregon, 208 US 412.
35 See generally A. Supiot (ed.), Au delà de l’emploi. Transformations du travail et devenir du droit du 
travail en Europe (Paris: Flammarion 1999).
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to market-based ordering in the areas of economic and, increasingly, social policy. To 
consider why this might be the case, we will take a closer look at how contractual 
regulation works in the context of labour markets.
4 Justifi cations for the Regulation of Labour Contracts
Labour markets in developed economies are intensively regulated. This is just as true of 
‘liberal market’ systems, such as those of the United States and the United Kingdom, as 
it is of the ‘coordinated market’ economies of continental Europe and east Asia.36 The 
United States lacks employment protection legislation of the kind commonly found in 
Europe (including the United Kingdom) and its collective labour law system covers 
a diminishing segment of the workforce, but it has a considerable body of regulatory 
legislation in relation to such areas as minimum wages, hours of work, occupational 
safety and health, employment discrimination, social security, employer-based retirement 
pensions and employer-based health insurance.37 How much of this regulation can be 
justifi ed, or at least explained, on paternalistic grounds?
 Sunstein and Thaler’s infl uential defi nition views paternalism as any intervention 
designed to improve the welfare of individuals whose choices do not refl ect their 
true interests.38 This is likely to be the case, they suggest, where individuals have less 
than complete information, limited cognitive capacities, and a lack of self-control. 
‘Drawing’, as they put it, ‘on some well-established fi ndings in behavioural economic 
and cognitive psychology’, they argue that these conditions prevail more often than 
not in the context (among others) of labour contracting.39 The employment relationship 
provides an example of a situation in which preferences are likely to be ill-defi ned 
and context-dependent: ‘contextual infl uences render the very meaning of the term 
“preferences” unclear’.40 Paternalism is not just legitimate, it is unavoidable in the sense 
that even a default rule of at-will employment (implying no external legal regulation of 
employment termination decisions) implies a framing effect of a particular kind that 
will infl uence behaviour.
 ‘Libertarian paternalism’ proposes a set of techniques aimed at enhancing the quality 
of choice and, hence, of outcomes in situations where individuals act with less than 
complete transactional capacity. Libertarian paternalism is incompatible with ‘any 
approach that blocks individual choices’41 – in other words, mandatory legislation. It 
is, on the other hand, entirely compatible with the wide array of derogations, waivers 
and opt-outs (or opt-ins) that are increasingly found in employment statutes. These 
techniques allow the parties some freedom of choice but tend to frame that choice 
by requiring that derogations from legislative standards are confi ned in terms of their 
substantive scope (as in the case of statutory wage premia for over-time work) or by 
reference to procedural safeguards (such as requirements that individual waivers be in 
writing, in a certain form or validated by a legal adviser or other representative).42
 At the core of the libertarian paternalist proposal is the claim that, in many contexts, 
individual decision-making is irrational but can be made more rational through targeted 
regulatory interventions. These interventions are paternalistic in the sense of protecting 
individuals against the consequences of their own decisions but libertarian in the sense 
of improving the quality of the decisions they take. Private action is moulded, or steered, 
but not entirely displaced.
36 On the distinction between ‘liberal market’ and ‘coordinated market’ systems, see P. Hall and D. Soskice, 
‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’ in P. Hall and D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: OUP 2001).
37 See O. Lobel, ‘The Four Pillars of Work Law’ (2006) 104 Michigan Law Review 1539.
38 C. Sunstein, and R. Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism is not an oxymoron’ (2003) 73 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1159.
39 Id., at 1162.
40 Id., at 1161.
41 Id.
42 Id., at 1186-1187.
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 The fundamental diffi culty with libertarian paternalism is that it employs a notion of 
‘rationality’ that is neither a good descriptive model of human behaviour nor a meaningful 
benchmark for the design of legal institutions. As we have seen, for behaviour to be 
rational it simply has to be preference-consistent. Decision-making infl uenced by the 
endowment effect, framing, inequality aversion or other heuristic biases identifi ed by 
prospect theory is not, by virtue of such infl uence, ‘irrational’. None of these effects 
‘illustrates preference inconsistency once the appropriate parameter (current time, 
current position, status quo point) is admitted into the preference function’.43
 The point is not simply a defi nitional one. The model of rationality that is emerging 
from empirical studies of strategic interaction (both laboratory experiments and fi eld 
work) in the last decade is one in which human behaviour is essentially ‘pro-social’. 
Individuals display tendencies towards ‘altruistic cooperation’ and its converse, 
the punishment of non-cooperation, in contexts where such behaviour is not in their 
individual self-interest, even over the long run. Human agents are other-regarding as 
well as self-regarding, they have ‘social preferences’ that ‘facilitate cooperation and 
exchange’ and ‘moral preferences’ for the character virtues of honesty and loyalty. 
Above all, they display a ‘meta-preference’ for conforming to norms that provide 
guidance on what constitutes socially appropriate behaviour in a given context. Thus, 
preferences do not lack ‘meaning’,44 but both they and their behavioural consequences 
are ‘situationally specifi c’.45
 The origins of the pro-social bias in human behaviour are probably biological: 
‘human beings did not evolve facing general decision-theoretic problems. Rather, they 
faced a few specifi c decision-theoretic problems associated with survival in small social 
groups’.46 This is an area in which the key research questions are still being formulated, 
let alone answered. We do not need to have more complete answers to this set of 
questions in order to consider the implications of the amended rational actor model for 
issues of legal policy and design.
 A fi rst point to make is that very few if any of the regulatory interventions that take 
place in modern labour (or other) markets can properly be termed ‘paternalistic’ in the 
sense of protecting contracting parties against the consequences of their own decisions. 
This set of cases should be confi ned to situations in which individual agents do not display 
preference consistency (true ‘irrational’ behaviour). As nineteenth century contract law 
recognised, contract enforcement should be denied, or at least conditioned by certain 
protective devices, in cases where it is not safe to assume that individuals possess the 
capacity for rational action in this specifi c sense of the term.47 This category of instances 
is of marginal and decreasing relevance for labour law. Early factory legislation may 
have regulated the working hours and employment conditions of women and children 
on the grounds, in part, that these groups, in contrast to adult males, did not know their 
own best interests,48 but this is not a ground for intervention that has been invoked since 
at least the early decades of the twentieth century.
 A second point to fl ow from the amendment of the rational actor model is that 
alternative, non-paternalistic justifi cations should be sought for labour market 
interventions. New institutional economics provides part of the answer here, in suggesting 
a role for regulation in addressing contractual incompleteness, asymmetric information 
and externalities of the kind that are commonly found in labour markets.49 This body of 
literature suggests that labour law rules can be justifi ed not solely by reference to the 
protection of the interests of the ‘weaker’ party to the employment contract but, more 
43 Gintis, above n. 4, at 25.
44 Sunstein and Thaler, above n. 38, at 1161.
45 Gintis, above n. 4, at 75.
46 Id., at 29.
47 See the discussion in section 2, above.
48 See  Deakin and Wilkinson, above n. 23, at 226-231.
49 B. Kaufman, ‘Labour Law and Employment Regulation: Neoclassical and Institutional Perspectives’ in 
K. Dau-Schmidt, S. Harris and O. Lobel (eds.), Labor and Employment Law and Economics (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar 2009).
150 SIMON DEAKIN 
generally, in terms of the benefi cial effects they confer upon all market actors. In other 
words, it is the aggregate wealth-enhancing effects of labour law rules that matter, not 
their redistributional effects for particular contracting agents.
 Useful as it is in dispelling some of the more dogmatic and doctrinaire arguments 
of law and economics scholars against labour market regulation, new institutional 
economics perhaps claims too much in seeking to portray labour law rules as market-
perfecting devices. If they improve market outcomes, they tend to do so in an imprecise 
way. A more realistic account of labour law rules would see them from an evolutionary 
perspective, that is to say, as emergent solutions to coordination problems of the kind to 
which labour markets typically give rise.50 These solutions (factory legislation, collective 
bargaining, minimum wages, social insurance and so on) are historically contingent, 
context-dependent and often imperfect in their effects. They may be endogenous in 
the sense of being generated by conditions in labour markets to which they respond, 
but they are not spontaneous. While they may enhance aggregate wealth or well-being, 
they often do so at the expense of certain groups.51 As such, they almost invariably 
involve distributional compromises that are the subject of deliberative decision-making 
processes located, at least partially, in the political domain.
 Sunstein and Thaler52 are right to point to the very widespread use of default rules of 
various kinds in contemporary labour legislation, but it is not necessary to invoke the 
theory of libertarian paternalism to explain the origin of these rules or how they work. 
Their goal can be understood as ‘market steering’ in the sense of framing overall market 
outcomes, but this is distinct from the aim of moulding individual transactions.53 For 
the most part, labour law rules of this ‘refl exive’ type involve collectively negotiated 
derogations rather than the individual waivers favoured by Sunstein and Thaler. As such, 
they are premised on the assumption that the design and implementation of labour law 
rules can benefi t from collective learning, that is to say, from a process of dialogue and 
deliberation involving the collective parties (representatives of employers and workers 
and representatives of the state).54 Labour law involves an almost endless search for 
workable solutions in which outcomes are mostly determined, for better or worse, by the 
interplay of political forces and by the relative strength of the interest groups involved.55
 Under these circumstances, the libertarian paternalist agenda is highly problematic 
for labour law. The libertarian aspect of the programme would involve the dismantling 
of the many mandatory norms still operating in this fi eld and their replacement with 
default rules of various kinds. Making adherence to labour standards optional may be 
benefi cial if it helps to generate a learning process about which solutions work and which 
do not, but it can also destabilise social norms that provide a basis for cooperation. The 
paternalist aspect of libertarian paternalism implies that solutions can be crafted by 
enlightened regulators deploying the techniques of cost-benefi t analysis. This neglects 
the role that collective deliberation plays in legitimising the distributional compromises 
on which labour law rules ultimately rest. Better justifi cations for labour law regulation 
are available.
5 Market Access as a Capability
Whatever their pre-modern roots may be, markets in modern industrialised societies are 
not natural or spontaneous phenomena. They are complex systems that have evolved 
alongside other mechanisms of coordination, including the legal system. The market and 
50 A. Hyde, ‘What is Labour Law?’ in G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds.), Boundaries and Frontiers of 
Labour Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2006).
51 G. Davidov, ‘Comment on Alan Hyde: The Perils of Economic Justifi cations for International Labour 
Standards’ (2009) 3 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 180.
52 See above n. 38.
53 J. Howe, R. Johnstone and R. Mitchell, ‘Constituting and Regulating the Labour Market for Social 
and Economic Purposes’ in C. Arup et al. (eds.), Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation (Sydney: 
Federation Press 2006).
54 P. Gahan and P. Brosnan, ‘The Repertoires of Labour Market Regulation’ in Arup et al., above n. 53.
55 A. Supiot, ‘Introduction’, in Supiot, above n. 35.
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the legal system complement and, in a deep sense, stabilise each other. While markets 
may be self-organising, this does not mean that they are always stable. The regulation 
of exchange is one of the techniques by which the legal system imparts stability to the 
market and renders its operation compatible, more generally, with societal coordination.
 It follows that one of the consequences of the legal regulation of contracts is to 
facilitate the kind of individual autonomy that exists within a functioning market order. 
This ‘autonomy’ is the result of the opportunity, which the market provides to those 
with access to it, to participate in a system of exchange based on an extensive, societal 
division of labour. The market, so conceived, makes it possible for the wants of any 
individual actor to be met to the greatest possible extent that is consistent with the wants 
of all others. In principle, the preferences of all market actors are factored into the prices 
against which individuals decide whether or not to trade and, if so, to what extent. Thus, 
the gains from trade that any one individual can expect to make are contingent not just 
upon their preferences and the resources available to them but also upon the value others 
place on them, which in turn is a function of those others’ preferences and resources. 
This much is familiar from classical law and economics. But we can go further. The 
implication of evolutionary law and economics is that without the coordinating devices 
of (among other things) social norms and legal regulation, there would be no markets in 
the sense that we are familiar with from the experience of modern societies or only less 
extensive and less socially valuable ones.
 Given the functional role played by norms and laws, in what sense can it be said 
that contractual regulation infringes the autonomy of the contracting parties? One 
implication of juxtaposing autonomy and paternalism is that individuals have a right 
to receive the returns that they would have made if the contract had been struck free 
of regulation. This is, however, an illusion. Just as there is no such thing as an entirely 
‘free’ (or unregulated) market, so there is no exchange which, at some level, is not being 
infl uenced by the normative structures that make market coordination possible.
 A more justifi able claim is that the legal system should acknowledge and protect 
the right of individuals to meaningful participation in the market. This does not mean a 
right to a particular outcome, such as a wage or income of a certain level, but nor does 
it mean simply a right to take part in a given, isolated exchange. One of the principles 
underpinning minimum wage legislation is that wages should refl ect as far as possible 
the social cost of labour, which includes the costs of its reproduction. The claim for a 
‘living wage’ is in essence a claim to a wage that at least meets the costs of subsistence. 
As nineteenth century political economy recognised, when wages are paid below 
subsistence, either the labour supply will shrink (so reducing the scope of the market) 
or other mechanisms of support, such as the family or the social security system (as the 
poor law has become), will have to be found.56 There are strong arguments on incentive-
compatibility and resource-allocation grounds for ensuring that the social costs of 
labour are met as far as possible through the wage system, rather than the social security 
system.57 But the point can also be made in ethical terms: minimum wage laws are a 
more effective means of enhancing labour market opportunities than tax credits, the 
principal alternative, which have a low take-up in large part because of the punitively 
high marginal tax rates to which they give rise.
 Access to the labour market is a ‘capability’ that many labour law rules, in particular 
those in the rapidly developing fi eld of employment discrimination law, protect and 
promote.58 A ‘capability’, in this context, refers to the capacity of an individual agent to 
realise a range of desired goals through participation in the labour market. These goals 
(Sen’s ‘functionings’59) are subjectively defi ned and are not restricted to the material or 
fi nancial aspects of employment but also include the psycho-sociological benefi ts of 
participation in organised economic activity. The capability approach focuses not on 
the content of functionings (these are individual-specifi c) or on outcomes according 
to an objective criterion of individual welfare or well-being such as expected utility 
56 Deakin and Wilkinson, above n. 48, at 231-234.
57 Id., at 188-192.
58 Id., at 342-353.
59 Sen, above n. 10, at 235-238.
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but on the environmental preconditions (broadly understood) of effective choice. These 
preconditions may refer to the physical or institutional environment. Thus, the capability 
approach opens up a debate, among other things, about the appropriate institutional 
conditions for substantive choice. While markets are, in principle, capability-enhancing 
institutions, given the opportunities for social and economic participation that they 
provide, access to markets depends on a set of prior conditions that are institutional and, 
to some degree, legal in nature.
 The way employment discrimination law works exemplifi es this point. The 
relationship between discrimination law and classical contract law mirrors that between 
the capability approach and standard law and economics analysis. The capacity-
enhancing function of discrimination law is particularly evident in the case of what 
is arguably the most advanced type of equal treatment legislation, that is, legislation 
prohibiting disability discrimination. Thus type of legislation is ‘advanced’ in the sense 
that concepts used elsewhere in discrimination law – ‘direct discrimination’, referring 
to unequal treatment on prohibited grounds, and ‘indirect discrimination’, referring 
to group disadvantage arising from institutional practices – have been modifi ed in the 
context of disability to produce a ‘duty of reasonable adjustment’ on the part of the 
employer. This means that the employer has a responsibility to organise the workplace 
in such a way as to enable the individual worker to carry out the duties of the post in 
question, while taking account of his or her disability. The duty is not absolute; the court 
in essence applies a proportionality test, taking into account the cost and practicability 
of adjustments and their impact on the ability of the worker to carry out the task.60 But 
even so, the effect is to alter the conceptual framework of discrimination law in ways 
that point to its potential for enhancing capabilities. Rather than requiring the individual 
to be ‘adaptable’ to changing market conditions, the law requires that employment 
practices be adapted to the circumstances of the individual.61 If disability discrimination 
laws go further than most forms of social legislation currently do in imposing affi rmative 
duties on employers in the name of market access, they nevertheless illustrate a general 
tendency of the law to grant substantive recognition to new forms of contractual capacity 
or, in economic terms, ‘capability’.
 The precise way in which legal rules perform this role is a matter for more detailed, 
applied analysis in particular contexts. An important starting point in this kind of 
analysis will be to consider how it can be informed by an evolutionary analysis of 
law. It would be consistent with the capability approach to advocate a methodology 
that is less concerned with measuring outcomes in welfare terms than with putting 
forward principles for action of a procedural kind, intended to enrich the process of 
knowledge accumulation on which societal coordination depends. Thus, ‘the capability 
approach points to an informational focus in judging and comparing overall individual 
advantages, and does not, on its own, propose any specifi c formula about how that 
information may be used’. It does not set out any particular ‘blueprint for how to deal 
with confl icts between, say, aggregative and distributive considerations’, and does not 
prescribe formal equality of capabilities, as opposed to the expansion of capabilities 
in general, as a meaningful goal.62 It may be doubted whether the capability approach, 
so defi ned, sits entirely happily with a conception of libertarian paternalism based on 
the assumed ability of an enlightened planner to ‘nudge’ individuals in the direction of 
exchanges that, by reference to an external standard, enhance their well-being.63
6 Conclusion
This article has attempted to set out an evolutionary conception of contract law as the 
basis for assessing claims made in the autonomy-paternalism debate. It has argued 
60 See generally S. Deakin and G. Morris, Labour Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2006, 5th ed.) paras. 
6.116-6.128.
61 Deakin, above n. 24, at 26-28.
62 Sen, above n. 10, at 232.
63 C. Sunstein and R. Thaler, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2008).
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that a discriminating approach to contract enforcement is a long-standing feature of 
contract law systems, which has coevolved with the emergence of market-based 
economies in liberal democratic societies. The regulation of contracts with a view to 
establishing norms of societal coordination is at the core of contract law doctrine and 
is central to the market-supporting role that legal institutions in general perform. Using 
examples from labour law, the article has also shown how contractual regulation can 
be justifi ed in normative terms by reference to capability theory. Markets are important 
capability-enhancing institutions, but this effect depends on regulatory mechanisms that 
complement the operation of the market.
